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Abstract: We introduce the special issue on the question ‘Isn’t all art performed?’
We believe the affirmative answer is obvious, but the way the issue is often ad-
dressed in the philosophical literature presents a tension worth exploring. Perhaps
some misunderstanding regarding what is considered an artwork has led to some
misunderstanding regarding what performances are and how important they are
ontologically. The working intuition in most contributions to this issue is that an
artwork does not exist unless it is performed.
When we posed the philosophical question ‘Isn’t all art performed?’, we did
not imagine that such a question might present a dilemma. The answer is
either so obvious that potential respondents did not imagine having much in
the way of philosophical prestidigitation to offer or they had never considered
this question before, so they felt unprepared to tackle it. Those who did find
a way to address our provocation used this occasion to explore the aesthetic
aspects of projects and professions rarely addressed in the aesthetics litera-
ture, such as improvised architecture, made-for-the-screen stand-up comedy
routines, artistic modelling, everyday gift-reception and performance art.
We believe the affirmative answer is obvious, but the way the issue is often
addressed in the philosophical literature presents a tension worth exploring –
a tension that inspired the titular question and this special issue of Aesthetic
Investigations as a whole. Typically, philosophers have considered ‘performed
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artworks’ to require scores, scripts and texts, thus excluding anything impro-
vised or aleatory, autographic art, social practices, open-ended processes and
even live-streamed performances. This is reflected in Andrew Kania’s recent
framing of the problem: music typically admits of both the work itself and
its performances, whereas jazz has only performances and sculpture has only
work.1 We worry that his view engenders a definitional dichotomy of work
and performance, such that not all art forms require both dimensions.
Perhaps some misunderstanding regarding what is considered an artwork
has led to some misunderstanding regarding what performances are and how
important they are ontologically. In this special issue we explore performances
as presentations of artworks, whether on stage, in an alley, in a museum, in a
home, in a forest, online or in the classroom. The working intuition in most
contributions is that an artwork does not exist unless it is performed.
Kania’s view seems to track that of Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art,
a book we admire. What we find important to question is how and why
Goodman’s explanation of the two-stage relationship between scores, scripts
and texts on the one hand and their performances on the other has become
philosophical dogma. Goodman considered making an artwork’s reception
its ‘end-product’. He briefly discussed, but thereafter rejected the possibility
that ‘the lookings at a picture and the listenings to a performance qualify
equally as end-products or instances’ of two- and three-stage processes, re-
spectively.2 This picture, compelling as it might be, is open to complexities
that Goodman does not account for. For example, an artwork’s creation is
non-controversially informed by an artist’s skill set, the gradual acquisition
of which could be considered an initial stage in the making of the work.
With the addition of this stage, the steps become four – from skill acquisition
to execution to performance (performer’s interpretation) to public reception
(spectators’ evaluations). These, of course, are not always easy to separate
analytically, which is probably why Kania regards jazz improvisation as a
one-step performance rather than the culmination of a musician’s lifework.
Having been a gallerist, Goodman would have probably agreed that some-
one, whether the artist or another person, must make a definitive decision
regarding how best to pose even a modest sculpture. Such considerations
might include, for example, whether to use a white pedestal or a raw steel
table, whether to place it far from or adjacent other artworks and whether to
position it against a wall or in the middle of the room, etc. Such decisions
could be considered ‘performance decisions’, no different than opting to con-
duct a score faster or louder than its musical notation indicates, performing
a stage play over the radio or carefully retyping pages from an extant text.
It seems to us that ‘performance decisions’ guide repeat performances, a.k.a.
instantiations, of all artworks.
This leads to the question, ‘When is a “performance decision” a perfor-
mance and when is it an artwork all its own?’ This is a question that we, the
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co-editors of this special issue, have been debating for five years. Ventzislavov
considers curators artists in their own right, whereas Spaid sees curators as
performing artworks on behalf of artists.3 Neither side of this disagreement
has to commit to Kania’s picture – the difference between our views is not
a matter of collapsing a two-stage art into a one-stage one. Instead, our
disagreement can be viewed as an exploration of the nature of ‘performance
decisions’ and their potential to add artistic value to already existing art-
works. We are curious whether dancers, actors or conductors perform their
skill sets on behalf of some artist or as their own artwork.4 When the per-
former and artist are one and the same, as with most cases of performance
art, this question becomes especially interesting.5
A related performance-artwork conundrum emerges in Darren Hudson
Hick’s analysis of Simon Morris’ novel Getting Inside Jack Kerouac’s Head
(2010), which was initially presented as a series of blog entries (2008-2009),
for which Morris ‘laboriously’ retyped a page a day of Jack Kerouac’s original
manuscript for On the Road. To determine whether GIJKH is a new artwork,
Hicks begins his assessment by pitting Morris’s text against textualists like
Goodman who require instantiations of literary works to be exact replicas.
Morris’s book, however, replicates his blog, but fails as an exact replication
of Kerouac’s manuscript, since it contains errors such as a left-hand quote
mark instead of a right-hand one and fewer underlined words than the origi-
nal manuscript. Hicks remarks, ‘[O]n Goodman’s view, a copy with a single
typo – even a single misplaced comma – would not be an instance of the work.
Even putting aside the reverse ordering of pages, that single misdirected quo-
tation mark on page 317 of GIJKH would disqualify it as an instance of
the work’.6 Hicks adds that many find Goodman’s standard unrealistic since
many reprints have typos.
If Goodman’s standard is informed by some absolute measure of ‘perfor-
mative fidelity’, we find it more realistic to think of fidelity as a matter of
relative magnitude. Another complication is that fidelity is not just a matter
of expressive similarity, but also of critical engagement. Sherrie Levine’s re-
photographing Walker Evans’ images and Elaine Sturtevant’s copying Frank
Stella paintings are good examples of this. While these works sustain high
levels of expressive fidelity to the originals, their critical intent and context
guards them against charges of mere appropriation. Appropriation, indeed, if
it is accepted as art, would most often exhibit the expressive qualities of the
original faithfully, while shunning the critical tensions and opportunities that
such transpositions catalyse. Levine and Sturtevant’s artworks are discussed
in wholly different terms than those by Evans or Stella, which would not be
possible in cases of mere appropriation. The most extreme case along the
fidelity spectrum is, of course, forgery. A good forgery is good precisely on
account of its expressive qualities, but nonetheless a forgery because of its to-
tal obliteration of context. Goodman’s hard distinction between autographic
and allographic artworks, which he used to explain why forgeries could not
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be artworks, still does not seem to capture the nuance of performance across
the fidelity/criticality scale.
One way to challenge the philosophical dogma of Goodman’s hard dis-
tinctions is to propose compelling counter-examples. One such example, on
Spaid’s view, is the understanding of exhibitions as new instantiations of
autographic artworks. Hicks likely agrees since he quotes Marjorie Perloff’s
remark that ‘context always changes content’.7 This approach finds a parallel
in the performing arts. As it turns out, when Gunther Schuller analysed mul-
tiple recordings of famous scores, he was quite surprised to learn that most
were conducted in far less exacting ways than Morris’s modest modifications
to Kerouac’s manuscript.8 If we treat Morris’s effort as an instantiation of an
extant text, rather than an artwork all its own, does it matter who reprints,
reads aloud or records On the Road? For example, isn’t it the same joke
whether a comedian tells it in a dark comedy club, then performs it live be-
fore a studio audience on multiple late-night TV shows, after which our friend
repeats it over dinner?
Alternatively, when we get closer to expressive qualities, does it really
matter whether Morris performs Kerouac’s script backwards or forwards?
We agree that recording Kerouac’s manuscript in reverse chronology (reading
the last page first, etc.) would likely result in a jumbled mess, making it
difficult to follow its narrative. As Hicks points out, Morris’s story, unlike
Kerouac’s, starts out west and ends up back east. In challenging the view that
Morris’s book is merely an instantiation of Kerouac’s book, Hicks reminds the
reader that ‘anything that is true of one [instantiation] is true of the other,
including matters of interpretation and assessment’.9 No doubt, we would
assess a reversed narrative differently, granting each version its distinct critical
dimension, which in turn would make them different artworks. However,
Hicks describes Morris’s project as the writer’s attempt to get a better handle
on Kerouac by typing the words as the author did. And in fact, Morris typed
the pages in the same order as Kerouac, only he stacked the most recent page
atop the earliest one, rather than behind it as one usually does. Although
we consider Morris’s object to be a performance of an extant text, we find
it exemplary of conceptual art since this instantiation directs our attention
to literary issues regarding sequence, format and compliance, which gives the
underlying text a new meaning.
It thus pays to consider Morris’s effort a new performance of an extant
artwork. Although his book is in reverse order, a reader who wants to read
Kerouac’s text could easily start from the last page and read forward, making
it effectively the same text, plus/minus Morris’s minor modifications. Hicks
seems to agree, since he credits both Jerrold Levinson and Gregory Currie
with the view that Morris is closer in effect to a typesetter ‘involved in an act
of instantiation, and not an act of creation’.10 Had Morris read or recorded
Kerouac’s manuscript backwards, it would truly be a different ball of wax.
As it stands, however, the legitimacy of Morris’ claim to have made a new
4
Sue Spaid and Rossen Ventzislavov
artwork hangs on the critical dimension of its intention and reception. In
terms of critical intention, the questions of whether ‘performance decisions’
are mere instantiations and what qualifies them as artworks remain beyond
this issue’s purview. As to the critical reception of Morris’s novel, only time
will tell whether it’s deemed a new creation.
Our special issue places an emphasis on the socially-constructed critical
contexts that circumscribe an artwork’s public entry into the artworld. We
appreciate how our contributors engage these contexts and shed light on the
initial question we posed regarding artworks and their performances. Aurélie
Debaene outlines several kinds of artist models to demonstrate how mod-
elling is an artistic performance, which like jazz and improvisational theatre
reflects an artist’s skill set. In addition to solidly convincing us of modelling’s
artistic merits, she analyses specific cases such as life model Dominic Blake
and models’ greater autonomy via Zoom. Kenneth Wilder’s paper on archi-
tecture as performance surveys some of Goodman’s distinctions, but reaches
a conclusion that goes well beyond Goodman’s architectural paradigm. The
performative aspect of architecture not only begins with design and construc-
tion decisions, but it culminates in the imaginary ‘enactment’ of a receptive
audience. Frank Boardman gets closer to what we normally think of as the
performing arts. In his definitional account of comedy specials, he explores
the difference between one- and two-stage artistic processes and interrogates,
among many things, the balance of performative authorship between the co-
median’s live set(s) and the ‘special’ created by the filmmaker’s team. Sue
Spaid describes how gift recipients must imagine how to fit unexpected gifts
into everyday life, which requires them to interpret appropriate contexts. She
compares this ‘agonistic’ process, which she terms enacting the gift, to artwork
reception. Our issue of Aesthetic Investigations is rounded out by two related
reviews and Gemma Argüello Manresa’s article regarding feminist pedagogi-
cal performance artist Mónica Mayer in the Art and Artists Section. Rossen
Ventzislavov discusses a recent performance by legendary performance artist
Ron Athey. His article tightens the focus on the relationship between author-
ship and context, asking what it means to be a creative agent in a polyvalent
communally-driven art practice like Athey’s. Dror Pimentel’s evaluation of
the ecological and social issues explored in the film The Survivalist (2021)
demonstrates how interpretations are a kind of performance. Both reviews
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